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Abstract 
This study aims to analyze the effect of corporate 
governance mechanism on tax aggressiveness with 
earnings management as intervening variable. In this 
study, corporate governance is measured by institutional 
ownership and the proportion of indepe
commissioners. The sample used in this study is 43 
manufacturing companies taken using purposive 
sampling technique. The type of data used is panel data 
while the data analysis used is path analysis model. The 
results of the study found that institutional ownership 
and the proportion of independent board of 
commissioners had a significant negative effect on 
earnings management and institutional ownership with 
significant negative impact on tax aggressiveness. The 
proportion of independent board of commissioners 
earnings management are found to have significant 
positive effect on tax aggressiveness
results show that earnings management variables are 
able to mediate the relationship of institutional 
ownership and proportion of independent board of 
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Taxes are an important phenomenon and the focus of government. The government creates 
tax-related programs and regulations aimed at maximizing state revenues from the tax 
sector. However, in recent years the realization of tax revenue in Indonesia has not yet 
reached the target set by the government. The government's inability to achieve tax 
revenue target can be caused by various factors, one of which is the company's aggressive 
attitude toward taxes. 
According to the Ministry of Finance, of a total of 12 million corporate taxpayers only 11% 
routinely report annual tax returns. This is evidenced by the low tax ratio of Indonesia 
which is only 10.3% compared to other countries such as Malaysia over 13%, and Vietnam 
and Singapore which has reached 16%. According to Suyanto & Supramono (2012), the 
company is considered more aggressive against taxes if more and more gaps are used. 
Companies tend to tax aggressiveness in order to minimize the tax burden to increase the 
company's net income (Chen et al., 2010). 
Corporate governance within the company is necessary to reduce the existence of tax 
aggressiveness so that it can have a positive impact on tax compliance. The Company 
implements corporate governance to create effective corporate performance and impact on 
decisions to be effective in determining policies related to the effective corporate tax rate 
(Pranoto & Widagdo, 2015). This research refers to research conducted by Nugroho & 
Firmansyah (2017), Prawira (2017), Hanna & Haryanto (2016), Cahyono et al., (2016), 
Fadli (2016), Wulansari (2015), Pranoto & Widagdo (2015), Embree (2012), Suyanto & 
Supramono (2012), Khurana & Moser (2009), Badertscher et al., (2009) that uses 
corporate governance, which is measured using institutional ownership and independent 
board of commissioners, have an impact on tax aggressiveness. 
This study differs from the previous study as it uses institutional ownership and the 
proportion of independent board of commissioners in measuring corporate governance. 
These two corporate governance mechanisms are expected to make the management of the 
company better so that it will improve the company's performance and become an added 
value for the company. In addition, this study uses earnings management as an intervening 
variable. The act of tax aggressiveness that occurred closely related to the behavior of the 
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management who tend to practice earnings management in order to minimize the tax 
burden of the company. Kim et al., (2010) finds evidence that earnings management can be 
used as a tool for tax aggressiveness in order to reduce the tax burden. 
1. Literature Review 
1.1. Agency Theory 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) describes the agency relationship in agency theory that the firm 
is a collection of contracts between the owner of the economic resources (principal) and 
the manager (agent) that takes care of the use and control of the resource. Differences of 
interests that occur between the management of the company as taxpayers with tax 
authorities as tax collectors to cause conflict between the two. 
1.2. Positive Accounting Theory 
Positive accounting theory was proposed by Watts & Zimmerman (1986). Positive 
accounting theory explains the factors that make the management has a motivation in 
choosing methods and accounting principles that can improve the welfare of the company. 
Watts & Zimmerman (1986) reveals three main hypotheses in positive accounting theory, 
namely: (1) Bonus Plan Hypothesis, (2) Debt Convenant Hypothesis, (3) Political Cost 
Hypothesis. 
1.3. Hypothesis Development 
1.3.1. The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Management Earnings 
Institutional parties are considered sophisticated investors because the institutional can 
monitor the behavior and actions of management that will reduce the behavior of 
management to make earnings management (Midiastuty & Mahfoedz, 2003). This is in line 
with agency theory, which states that the ownership of shares by other institutions can 
reduce the conflicts of interest that occur and opportunistic behavior of management so as 
to reduce the potential likelihood of profit management practices (Jensen dan Meckling, 
1976). This is also in accordance with the results of research Jao & Pagalung (2011) which 
shows that institutional ownership affects earnings management. Based on the description 
above, the proposed hypothesis is as follows: 
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H1 : Institutional ownership has negative effect on the earnings management  
1.3.2. The Effect of Proportion of Independent Board of Commissioners on Earnings   
Management  
The independent board of commissioner is responsible for overseeing the activities of the 
company conducted by independent management who work for the company's interest in 
overseeing the process of preparing the financial statements. Therefore, the greater the 
proportion of independent board of commissioners the higher the supervision and 
expected to minimize opportunistic management behavior in the form of earnings 
management practices. Research conducted by Rahmawati (2013), Prastiti & Meiranto 
(2013), Jao & Pagalung (2011) indicate that independent board of commissioners have an 
influence on earnings management. Based on the description above, the proposed 
hypothesis is as follows: 
H2 : The proportion of independent board of commissioners has negative effect on 
earnings management  
1.3.3. The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Tax Aggressiveness 
It is believed that, the greater the ownership of shares owned by other institutions then 
they will have the ability to effectively control and supervise management and have the 
ability to influence the decisions and policies made by management (Easterbrook, 1984). 
Based on the agency theory, which states that by enlarging the ownership of shares by 
institutions outside the company can reduce the conflict of interest that occurred and 
opportunistic behavior of management so as to reduce the potential possibility of tax 
aggressiveness action. Research conducted by Nugroho & Firmansyah (2017), Cahyono et 
al., (2016), Hanna & Haryanto (2016), Mahulae et al., (2016), Prakosa (2014), Embree 
(2012),  Badertscher et al., (2009), Khurana & Moser (2009) show that institutional 
ownership has an influence on tax aggressiveness. Based on the description above, the 
proposed hypothesis is as follows: 
H3 : Institutional ownership has negative effect on tax aggressiveness  
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1.3.4. The Effect of Proportion of Independent Board of commissioners on Tax 
Aggressiveness  
Independent commissioners in the board of commissioners contribute to supervising 
managers to not take tax aggressiveness. The greater the ratio of independent 
commissioners in the composition of the board of commissioners will minimize the 
possibility of corporate tax aggressiveness. Supervision of independent commissioners 
makes management more transparent in disclosing corporate information so that tax 
aggressiveness activities can be minimized and even eliminated. Research conducted by 
Nugroho & Firmansyah (2017), Prawira (2017), Fadli (2016), Wulansari (2015), Pranoto & 
Widagdo (2015), Richardson et al., (2014), Fadli (2013), Armstrong et al., (2012),  Suyanto 
& Supramono (2012) indicate that independent board of commissioners influence tax 
aggressiveness. Based on the description above, the proposed hypothesis is as follows: 
H4 : The proportion of Independent board of commissioners has negative effect on tax  
   aggressiveness  
1.3.5. The Effect of Earnings Management on Tax Aggressiveness 
Tax is believed to be the problem for the companies because paying taxes will lower their 
net profit. Therefore, the company will make earnings management to reduce the tax 
burden (Scott, 2009). Based on the political cost hypothesis in positive accounting theory, 
management tend to manipulate profits in order to avoid government regulation. One of 
the government regulations that directly relates to corporate profits is corporate income 
tax. Research conducted by Hashim et al., (2016), Sari et al., (2016), Tiaras & Wijaya 
(2015), Kamila (2014), Ohnuma (2013), Suyanto & Supramono (2012), Frank et al., (2009) 
shows that earnings management has an influence on tax aggressiveness. Based on the 
description above, the proposed hypothesis is as follows: 
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1.3.6. The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Tax Aggressiveness through Earnings 
Management as Intervening Variable 
Ownership of shares of companies by other institutions is one part of corporate governance 
that allegedly can solve conflicts of interest between shareholders and management and 
can reduce opportunistic management behavior in the form of earnings management 
practices because ownership of shares of companies owned by other institutions can align 
the various interests between the interests of holders shares with the interests of the 
management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). With decreasing opportunistic management 
behavior in the form of earnings management practice, it is assumed that it can reduce the 
potential of tax aggressiveness. Based on the description above, the proposed hypothesis is 
as follows: 
H6 : Institutional ownership has positive effect on tax aggressiveness with earnings   
   management as intervening variable  
1.3.7. The Effect of Proportion of Independent Board of Commissioners on Tax 
Agressiveness through Earnings Management as Intervening Variable  
Independent board of commissioners is one part of corporate governance. Supervision of 
independent commissioners makes management more transparent in disclosure of 
company information and is expected to minimize opportunistic behavior of management 
in the form of earnings management so the profits presented will be in accordance with 
actual company conditions so that the tax burden of the company will also be in accordance 
with the existing reality (Jao & Pagalung, 2011). Based on the description above, the 
proposed hypothesis is as follows: 
H7 : The proportion Independent board of commissioners has an impact on tax  


















Figure 1.  Research Framework 
Notes: 
               : The effect of KI, DKI, DA, and ETR 
  : Mediating effect of KI, DKI and ETR  
 
2. Methodology 
2.1. Population and Sample 
Population in this study is manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange 
from 2012-2016 with the total of 152 companies. The sample selection used is purposive 
sampling method using the following criteria: (1) Not delisting during the observation 
periods, 2012-2016, (2) Using rupiah as the currency during the observation, (3) Earned 
profits successively during the study period. 
2.2. Analytical Method 
Regression method used in this research is panel data regression by using path analysis 
model. The structural equation in this research is as follows: 
DA =   + ₁ + ₂ + 	                          …… (1) 
ETR =   + 






























DA  = Earnings Management 
ETR   = Tax Agressiveness  
KI  = Institutional Ownership 
DKI  = Independent Board of Commissioners  
i  = Company - 1 
t  = Time - t 
₁ - β  = Regression coefficient 
ε - ε  = error 
3. Result and Discussion 
Data were analyzed by using panel data regression with path analysis model and to test the 
effect of mediation used sobel test. The following is the result of testing in this study by 










Figure 1.  The Test Result  
 



















C = -0.033 
p = 0.000 
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p = 0.000 
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p  = 0.000 
 
R2 = 0.83 
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3.1. The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Management Earnings 
Test results show that institutional ownership has a negative and significant impact on 
earnings management. This can be seen from the regression coefficient of institutional 
ownership showing the negative direction of -0.033 and the level of significance of 
institutional ownership of 0.000 smaller than 0.05 (α = 5%), which means H1 accepted. The 
coefficient of institutional ownership has a negative sign which means that the greater the 
shares owned by the institutional then they will have the ability to control and supervise 
the management effectively and have the ability to influence the decisions and policies 
made by the management to reduce the possibility of occurrence profit management 
practices (Midiastuty & Mahfoedz, 2003). The results of this study in accordance with the 
theory of the agency, namely by enlarging the ownership of shares by the institutional then 
it can reduce the conflicts of interest that occur and opportunistic behavior management 
that can reduce the practice of earnings management. The results of this study are 
consistent with the Jao & Pagalung (2011) study indicating that institutional ownership 
affects earnings management. 
3.2. The Effect of Proportion of Independent Board of Commissioners on Earnings 
Management 
The test results show that the proportion of independent board of commissioners has a 
negative and significant effect on earnings management. This can be seen from the 
regression coefficient of the proportion of independent board of commissioners showing 
the negative direction of -0.098 and the level of significance of institutional ownership of 
0.000 smaller than 0.05 (α = 5%), which means H2 is accepted. The coefficient of 
independent board's proportion has a negative sign which means that the increasing 
number of independent board of commissioners along with the improved role of the 
independent board of commissioners, is able to reduce the management's chance to 
practice earnings management. This is because the greater the composition of the board of 
independent commissioners, the higher the supervision in the company will be, thus, it will 
make the manager be more careful and transparent in running the company which will 
encourage the realization of Good Corporate Governance. The results of this study are 
consistent with the research of Rahmawati (2013), Prastiti & Meiranto (2013), Jao & 
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Pagalung (2011) which indicate that the proportion of independent board of 
commissioners influences earnings management. 
3.3. The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Tax Aggressiveness 
The results show that institutional ownership has a negative and significant effect on tax 
aggressiveness. This can be seen from the regression coefficient of institutional ownership 
showing the negative direction of -0.018 and the level of significance of institutional 
ownership of 0.000 smaller than 0.05 (α = 5%), which means H3 accepted. Coefficient value 
of institutional ownership has a negative sign, which means that if there is an increase in 
institutional ownership of shares it will decrease the chance of management to act 
aggressively against taxes. This shows that the size of the shares owned by the institutional 
will affect the amount of tax burden that must be paid by the company. By increasing 
institutional ownership, the higher the control of the management will be, thus, it will help 
to reduce the behavior of management to act aggressively against taxes. The results of this 
test in accordance with the theory of the agency, namely by increasing the institutional 
ownership, it can reduce the opportunity to act aggressively against taxes. Companies with 
higher institutional ownership tend to lower tax aggressiveness than companies with low 
institutional ownership (Badertscher et al., 2009). The results of this study are consistent 
with the research of Nugroho & Firmansyah (2017), Hanna & Haryanto (2016), Cahyono et 
al., (2016), Fadli (2016), Embree (2012), Khurana & Moser (2009) that found an effect of 
institutional ownership on tax aggressiveness. 
3.4. The Effect of Proportion of Independent Board of Commissioners on Tax 
Aggressiveness 
The results show that the proportion of independent board of commissioners has a positive 
and significant effect on tax aggressiveness. This can be seen from the regression 
coefficient of the proportion of the board of commissioners showing the positive direction 
of 0.020 and the significance level of the proportion of independent board of 0.000 that is 
smaller than 0.05 (α = 5%), which means H4 is rejected. This is because the result of the 
research shows that the proportion of independent board of commissioner has a positive 
effect on tax aggressiveness, meaning that the greater proportion of independent board of 
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commissioners will affect the amount of tax burden to be paid by the company. In this case, 
the independent board of commissioners has not been able to perform its role well since 
the independent board of commissioners actually increases the potential for tax 
aggressiveness due to the lack of oversight function of independent board members, it is 
assumed that the placement or addition of independent board members merely fulfills 
formal requirements, the granting of commissioners in Indonesia paid less attention to the 
competence and integrity of the commissioners, but tended as a tribute or reward only. 
This is also evidenced by the coefficient value of the proportion of independent board of 
commissioners that has a positive sign which means that the independent board of 
commissioners within a company can not dampen or reduce the management's behavior to 
act aggressively against taxes. The results of this study are consistent with Nugroho & 
Firmansyah (2017), Prawira (2017), Wulansari (2015), Pranoto & Widagdo (2015), Fadli 
(2013), Suyanto & Supramono (2012), which show that the proportion of independent 
board of commissioners influences tax aggressiveness. 
3.5. The Effect of Earnings Management on Tax Aggressiveness 
The test results show that earnings management has a positive and significant effect on tax 
aggressiveness. This can be seen from the earnings regression coefficient of earnings shows 
the positive direction of 0.380 and the level of significance of profit management of 0.000 is 
smaller than 0.05 (α = 5%), which means H5 accepted. Coefficient value of earnings 
management has a positive sign which means that if earnings management practices 
improve then there is likely to increase the chances of management to act aggressively 
against taxes. This indicates that the amount of tax burden to be paid by the company is 
influenced by earnings management practices conducted by the management. Profit 
management is done for the purpose of tax savings. Effect of earnings management in the 
form of income decreasing against corporate tax aggressiveness can be explained, as the 
profit becomes the benchmark to measure the amount of corporate tax burden. Therefore, 
management will report profits tailored to its objective, namely using accounting options 
that reduce the income or income decreasing as a form of tax evasion. The results of this 
study in accordance with the political cost hypothesis in positive accounting theory, i.e. the 
management tends to manipulate profit in order to avoid government regulation, one of 
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which is to avoid corporate income tax. The results of this study are consistent with 
Nugroho & Firmansyah (2017), Prawira (2017), Wulansari (2015), Pranoto & Widagdo 
(2015), Fadli (2013), Suyanto & Supramono (2012) which shows that earnings 
management has an effect on tax aggressiveness. 
3.6. The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Tax Agressiveness through Earnings 
Management as Intervening Variable 
The results of the sixth hypothesis testing (H6) by using the test sobel show that earnings 
management is able to mediate the relationship between institutional ownership to tax 
aggressiveness. This can be seen from the results of the test sobel showing the significance 
value between the institutional ownership variable, tax aggressiveness, and earnings 
management, that is 0.000, which is smaller than 0.05 (α = 5%), which means H6 is 
accepted. This suggests that the earnings management variable is able to mediate the 
relationship of institutional ownership to tax aggressiveness. The results of this study can 
be interpreted that the greater the shares owned by the institutional then it is able to 
reduce the opportunity of management to do earnings management practices so that if the 
practice of earnings management can be reduced it also can prevent the management 
behavior to be aggressive towards taxes. 
3.7. The Effect of Proportion of Independent Board of Commissioners on Tax 
Agressiveness through Earnings Management as Intervening Variable 
The results of the seventh hypothesis testing (H7) show that earnings management is able 
to mediate the relationship between the proportion of independent board of 
commissioners to tax aggressiveness. This can be seen from the result of the test that 
shows the significance value between the independent proportion of board of 
commissioners, tax aggressiveness, and earnings management, that is 0.000, which is 
smaller than 0.05 (α = 5%), which means H7 is accepted. This suggests that the earnings 
management variable is able to mediate the proportionate relationship of independent 
board of commissioners to tax aggressiveness. This can be interpreted that the increasing 
number of independent board of commissioners in a company will increase supervision on 
the management so that management makes more transparent in disclosure of company 
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information and expected to minimize opportunistic behavior of management in form of 
earnings management. By minimizing the opportunity to practice earnings management, 
the profits presented will be in accordance with the actual conditions of the company so 
that the tax burden of the company will also be in accordance with the existing reality, 
which means it can reduce tax aggressiveness. 
4. Conclusion 
The result of regression testing of panel data proves that corporate governance mechanism 
as measured by institutional ownership and the proportion of independent board of 
commissioner have a significant negative effect to earnings management. This means that 
the greater the institutional share of ownership and the increasing number of independent 
commissioners can reduce the behavior of management to practice earnings management. 
The result also proves that institutional ownership has a significant negative effect on tax 
aggressiveness, which means that the greater the institutional share of ownership the more 
likely it is to reduce aggressive action against taxes. Meanwhile, the proportion of 
independent board of commissioner has a positive effect on tax aggressiveness, meaning 
that an increasing number of independent board of commissioners are unable to reduce tax 
aggressiveness. This study also proves that earnings management has a positive effect on 
tax aggressiveness, which means that one of the objectives of earnings management 
practice is to minimize the corporate tax burden or in other words to act aggressively 
against taxes. 
In testing the effect of mediation using a sobel test found that earnings management 
mediated the institutional ownership relationship and the proportion of independent 
board of commissioners against tax aggressiveness. The greater the shares owned by the 
institutional then it will be able to reduce the opportunity of management to make earnings 
management so that if earnings management practices can be reduced, it will also reduce 
the behavior of the management to be aggressive towards taxes. Meanwhile, the higher the 
number of independent board of commissioners, the supervision of the management will 
also be increased, making management more transparent in the disclosure of company 
information and expected to minimize the opportunity to make earnings management. By 
minimizing the opportunity for management to make earnings management then the 
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profits presented will be in accordance with the actual company conditions so that 
corporate tax burdens will also be in accordance with the existing reality, which means it 
can reduce to be aggressive towards taxes. 
In addition, this study has several limitations and weaknesses, including the proxy of 
corporate governance used in this study is still limited to two variables, namely 
institutional ownership and the proportion of independent board of commissioners, and 
the independent variables used in this study only look in terms of non-financial factors that 
can affect the aggressiveness of taxes. Further research is expected to add other variables 
as a proxy of corporate governance mechanisms so as to further enrich the discussion of 
tax aggressiveness.  
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